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British Imperiatism in Microcosm: The Annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands! 
The expansion of the British empire in the nineteenth century has -generated all-
encompassing explanations . Such explanations cover not only additions to formal 
empire, but also extensions of informal empire - that is, extensions of economic 
dominance without political sovereignty.2 The phrase, informal empire, was used by 
Gallagher and Robinson. Writers have focused on turbulence in the periphery of 
empire, where threats to existing trade or investment led to centrally-sanctioned 
control over further territory, in the elusive search for stability . More recently, 
attention has returned to economic interests and social groups at the heart of empire, 
consciously influencing the policies of governments whose members shared those 
interests and belonged to those groups. Thus Davis and Huttenback3 (with the help 
of over forty research -- assistants) have investigated returns on investments in 
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange, where such companies had major 
outlays in the formal empire. 'Government was attuned to the interest of business, and 
willing to direct resources to ends that the business conveniently would have found 
profitable,. 4 In that community, London merchants, manufacturers, professionals and 
managers were dominant. 5 But the fmancial benefits of empire to them, and to the 
'Much of the search for this article was made possible by the award of an SSRC 
(now ESRC) grant, and by the Warden and fellows of Nuffield College, Oxford, who 
made me an associate fellow for a year. For both, many thanks . 
2This concept was utilised by J. Gallagher and R. E. Robinson in their influential 
article, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", Economic History Review, 2nd series, VI, 
1953 . 
3Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, with the assistance of Susan Gray 
Davis : Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British 
Imperialism, 1860-1912, Cambridge University Press, 1986_ 
%id, p. 307. 
5ibid, p.314_ 
upper class generally, were at the expense of the middle classes, whose taxes paid for 
the empire's defence, and to some degree, for its administration. 
Cain and Hopkins also argued for an affmity of interest and indeed 'of social class 
between nineteenth century British governments and the beneficiaries of empire.6 
However, they identified the latter as fmanciers and providers of services - a step 
away from Davis and Huttenback's passive investors, and also from the avid 
manufacturers seeking captive markets, who often peopled the core of Marxist 
theories . All such explanations permit of secondary imperial acquisitions to defend 
the territories of primary imperial interest. 
Unnoticed in most accounts of expansion, the Co cos (Keeling) Islands in the southern 
Indian Ocean were annexed by Britain in 1857. Is their annexation explained by the 
general causations outlined above? Or is it a pointer to other causes of the extension 
of empire? Can it tell us something about the formalisation and implementation of 
decisions, and the weight attached to economic and fmancial returns? The story of 
how annexation of these islands came about shows that there are many dimensions to 
an explanation, and that it is essential to put apparently discrete events into context 
and chronological order. 
* * * * * 
The Cocos (Keeling) Islands were unclaimed and uninhabited until 1826, when an 
Englishman, Alexander Hare, took to them about sixty people of assorted ethnic 
backgrounds , most originally coming from Java and the Malay peninsula . Leadership 
of the community passed to John Clunies Ross , who arrived with his family in 1827. 
Ross, trying to establish a trading depot and ship repair station, fmanced the 
community by the export of copra and coconut oil . He attempted more than once to 
persuade tile British government to annex the islands, but had been told with apparent 
6p. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins: British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 
1688-1914, and British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990, both 
Longman, 1993. 
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fmality in 1839 that 'H.M. government can have no concern with Mr. Ross or any 
individuals who may adventure to place themselves in a situation which is beyond the 
pale of the constitution'.1 Ths is not the voice of imperialism, economic or political, 
overt or covert, central or peripheral . Clunies Ross's trade was with the Dutch East 
Indies; were 'his' islands annexed by Britain it was likely that the Dutch would 
withdraw trading privileges in the Indies . If this happened he would divert to a British 
port and thereby swell British trade. But this argument was not persuasive to the 
British government. To use the terminology of Gallagher and Robinson, Britain 
wanted neither trade nor rule . 
Yet in 1857 the Cocos (Keelings) were annexed by Britain. What had changed? Was 
there now an opportunity for London-based investment? Or turbulence on the islands? 
Or had a threat from without made Britain suddenly value the tiny atoll (total land area 
about 14 square kilometres)? The Sydney Moming Herald of July 16, 1857 thought 
that this was so. The Dutch, it believed, had designs on the islands, and this was 
coupled with a new importance: the age of steam had arrived and it thought that 'this 
step [annexation] has been taken with a view to their being made a depot for steamers 
on what is termed the northern route to Australia' . The Singapore Free Press of 
December 10, 1857, also thought that a coaling station, docks and wharves were 
intended. It was true that the naval ship luno , which carried out the annexation, had 
a steam engine, run on eitller coal or wood, ancillary to her sails. 
However, there was no corroborative evidence of Dutch interest, nor did any coal 
depot or wharf appear after the annexation . A quite different explanation emerged . 
In 1885, H. O. Forbes, a naturalist who spent some time on the islands, wrote that 
tlle annexation was 'a ludicrous mistake on the part of Captain Fremantle [of the luno] 
1Normanby to Capel, May 1839, ADM 125 131, PRO. For a fuller account of 
the early days of the settlement, see M. Ackrill , The Origins and Nature of the First 
Permanent SetUement of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Historical Studies, vo!. 21, no. 
83,Oct. 1984. 
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. .. the island intended to be annexed was one of the same name somewhere in the 
Andaman Group'.8 F. Wood lones who also sojourned on the islands (and married 
a Clunies Ross daughter) endorsed this in 1910.9 But the authoritative Cambridge 
History of the British Empire ignored the idea of error and included the Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands in its account of 'important strategic extensions of territory ... taking 
place on the Eastern trade routes'. 10 Yet the islands ' belief in error was not 
extinguished, though C. H. Gibson Hill , medical officer to the cable station built on 
the islands and author of the most scholarly accounts of the islands' history , thought 
it 'more likely that the government, fearful of the attempts of other countries to 
outflank its communications with lndia, was acting to forestall them' . 11 
Then the pendulum swung back to the 'error' hypothesis. In 1958 P. N. Tarling in 
an article in Historical Studies made the first scholarly inquiries into a possible 
mistake a hundred years previously . Working largely from lndia and Foreign Office 
papers , he noted 'some inexactitude in the Colonial Office and some presumption in 
the Admiralty ... a little confusion of mind at the lndia Board. There the question was 
under consideration of occupying the Andamans as a whole' . 12 His article had a 
fleeting impact on official accounts, but a later popular book on the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands by K. Mullens thought that while there was error, the Maldives were the 
8H. O. Forbes , A Naturalist 's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago, London, 
1885, pp.16-17. 
9P. Wood lones , Coral and Atolls, London, 1910, p.28. 
IOCambridge History of the British Empire, vo!. ii , 1940, pp.814-185 . 
lie. H. Gibson Hill, Notes on the Cocos-Keeling Islands, Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society , vo!. XX, no. 2, December 1947, p.140. 
12P . N. Tarling, The Annexation of the Cocos-Keeling Islands, Historical Studies, 
vo!. viii, 1957/8, pAOI . 
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intended quarry. 13 A closer look at a greater variety of official archives, and the 
reconstruction of the precise sequence of events can dispense 
with many uncertainties . 
* * * * * . 
The Cocos (Keeling) Islands lie approximately 12° south of the Equator. To 
understand their annexation, it is essential to understand a I ittle of the history of a 
different set of Cocos Islands . In the Bay of Bengal, north of the Andaman Islands, 
and between \30 and 14° latitude north are the small islands of Great Coco and Little 
Coco, referred to collectively as the Cocos Islands . Tarling mentioned a short-lived 
settlement on the northerly Cocos in 1849. He wrote: 'A few years later - perhaps 
as a result of Dalhousie' s annexation of Pegu - the Company appears to have become 
more interested in the islands . .. J. A. Burkinyoung, a solicitor in Calcutta, resolved 
to establish a colony ... ' . This is a little misleading. The Company was of course the 
East India Company. However, its governing body, the Court of Directors in 
London, took no initiative over these Cocos Islands . Nor indeed did Dalhousie, 
Governor General of India, until approached by Burkinyoung .'4 Then, it is true, he 
saw in Burkinyoung's proposal to be given a grant of the land of the islands so that 
he might 'clear away the jungle, colonise, and bring under cultivation'lS a project 
which should be encouraged . 16 It would forestall unfriendly occupation. 
Establishing first that the islands were uninhabited,'7 Dalliousie wrote to the Court 
ilK. Mullens, Cocos-Keeling , Sydney, 1974, pp .21-22. 
'4Dalhousie to Court of Directors , January 8, 1856. Correspondence enclosed, 
with India Board to Colonial Office, February 29, 1856, Co 323 . 248 . PRO. 
'SBurkinyoung to Secretary to the Govenunent of India, August 4, 1855, enclosed 
as above . CO 323 . 248. PRO. 
16Governor General to Court of Directors, January 8, 1856, enclosed as above. 
CO 323 .248 . PRO . 
I7Superintendent of Marine to Gov . of India, 28 December, 1855, enclosed as 
above. CO 323 . 248. PRO . 
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of Directors, saying that the Cocos, to the best of his knowledge, had never been 
claimed by Burma (much of which he had conquered in 1853), nor did he think them 
to be British. Therefore he wanted them proclaimed as British, and the land on them 
given to the East India Company, so that it in turn could make a grant·of that land to 
Burldnyoung. 18 Dalhousie was punctilious in investigating points of law; moreover, 
behind his scrupulousness over a small addition to empire loomed a much larger one: 
the princely state of Oudh. 
DaUlOusie had come under increasing criticism, especially in parliament,19 for his 
additions to British India by conquest and by the doctrine of 'lapse' . The latter 
entailed transfer of territories without a fully recognised heir to the Governor 
General ' s rule. In early January 1856, at the time at which he wrote to the Court of 
Directors about the Cocos Islands, he was waiting to hear from it whether his plans 
for Oudh, which fell just· a little short of annexation, would be approved . The Court 
referred the plans to the India Board, (more correctly called the Board of Control) 
presided over by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This was the British government's 
half of the increasingly uneasy 'dual control' which dealt with Indian affairs in 
London. The cost and the ethics of additions to the Governor-General's dominion had 
become highly controversial and adverse publicity in Britian had to be weighed against 
a general government predisposition to do as the Governor-General wanted - provided 
it was inexpensive. So important was Oudh that British cabinet was then brought into 
the discussion.20 At such a juncture, with detailed plans for troop movements in 
readiness , it becomes understandable that Dalhousie while he waited, would not wish 
to jeopardize tllis wider aim by appearing to act precipitately in a small one. 
18Governor General to Court of Directors , January 8, 1856, enclosed as above. 
CO 323 . 248 . PRO . 
19See e.g. speech by R. Cobden, June 27, 1853, Hansard, 3rd series , vol. 
CXXYIIl, cols . 814-833 . 
20p . Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, London, 1989, p.651 . 
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The Court of Directors referred Dalhousie 's Cocos Islands inquiry to the India Board 
at the end of February.21 The Board, in turn , apparently favourable to this minor 
request, referred it to the Colonial Office, which might be thought knowledgeable 
about the international status of the islands, and about steps to ensure that 
Burkinyoung got his land grant. 22 The chief clerk of the Office, P. Smitll, noting 
iliat it did not possess a Horsbright Directory, consulted Finlay's Directory and a 
gazetteer in March. The gazetteer said that the Andaman Islands had been settled, but 
abandoned in 1796 - 'and I hear privately iliat they were formerly in the occupation 
of the East India Company' Y The Cocos Islands seemed 'natural dependencies' of 
the Andamans: therefore, a simple statement iliat that sovereignty had never been 
abandoned, and that naturally it included the Cocos Islands, would suffice. However, 
Smith was not entirely certain, and thought the matter should be referred to the British 
government's Doctors at Law - the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and the 
Queen's Advocate - for 'an opinion on the legal status of the islands, and for tile 
correct procedure to ensure that Burkinyoung got his grant. 24 The papers went on 
March 13: the lawyers did not reply until April 29. They held that British sovereignty 
over the Cocos Islands, if it ever existed, had lapsed through abandonment. The 
islands' Spanish and Portuguese discoverers had likewise lost any claim to them. 
They could now be armexed by the first person to occupy them. If this were done in 
tI1e Queen's name, 'then it will be competent to her Majesty to make a grant of tI1ese 
possessions to the East India Company' .25 This should be 'subject to some 
reasonable conditions for securing the clearance and colonisation of tI1e Country' . The 
21Court of Directors to India Board, February 27, 1856, enclosed as in footnote 
23. CO 323.248. PRO. 
22India Board to Colonial Office, February 29, 1856. CO 323 . 248. PRO. 
23Minute by P. Smitl1, March 3rd, 1856,. CO 323 . 248. PRO. 
2Aibid. 
25Doctors of Law to Colonial Office, April 29 1856. CO 323 . 247 . PRO. 
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Company in turn could then make a land grant to Burldnyoung. Hand-written copies 
of past correspondence were included with every new letter from one office to 
another, and copied to the growing number of participants in the discussion. So 
far there had been no disagreement between the offices . The lawyers had not 
specified what length of non-occupancy rendered possession void; Henry Labouchere, 
the Colonial Secretary, to avoid any doubt, was concerned that there should be no 
period of non-occupation once sovereignty was proclaimed?6 But who was to 
provide this occupancy, and more important still, who was to pay for it? Once these 
questions were asked , unanimity disappeared . The concern for cost must be set in a 
wider context. 
* * * * * 
The Crimean War (1854-45) , if it had any rational justification, had been fought by 
Britain to remove any threat to the overland route to India. The East India Company 
paid for the governmenf and defence of India, but thousands of British lives and 
millions of British pounds had been spent on the Crimean War. Who would now deny 
the Government of India the small expenditure which the acquisition and retention of 
the Cocos Islands required? The Colonial Office would, for one. Year after year, its 
budget was queried night after night in parliament, the inquisition terminating only by 
failure of a quorum, in the days before a parliamentary guillotine had been invented. 
It certainly was not going to pay anything it could avoid. More importantly, as the 
Crimean War drew to its close, Bright, Gladstone, and others trenchantly criticised 
its cost in men and money. No government office was prepared to incur additional 
expense in the prevailing ethos . The Court of Directors , happy to see the land go to 
Burldnyoung, nevertheless did not want expense on his behalf, and raised questions 
of the cost and suitability of placing troops on the islands for any length of time. The 
Admiralty , its budget severely pruned when the Crimean War ended, was prepared 
26Ball , Colonial Office, to India Board, May 10, 1856. CO 323 . 247. PRO. 
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to divert a ship to perfonn the annexation, but not provide for occupancy .21 The 
correspondence grew yet more in bulk, until agreement was reached on the most 
economical procedure. This was as follows: the Admiralty should provide the shjp 
whose commander would perfonn the annexation; on receiving his orders he should 
tell the Government of India of them, and of when he was likely to carry them out. 
The East India Company should then send two or three people to maintain occupancy, 
and the commander should report on the islands and on his accomplished mission to 
the Admiralty . That office should then tell the Colorual Office, which would arrange 
the land grant to the Company, (the law officers had advised tJlat it should not be in 
perpetuity) which would then make the grant over to Burldnyoung.28 A lack of 
urgency and a desire for economy penneated the correspondence, yet there was no 
reluctance in principle to acceding to ilie wishes of the Government of India. 
The Colonjal Office copying clerks worked in overcrowded quarters in the basements 
of nos . 13 and 14 Dowrung Street. Over the rune months of conSUltation, the 
descriptive phrases 'lying in the Bay of Bengal' or 'appended to the Andaman Islands' 
were dropped from letters to and from tJUs Office . No party to the correspondence 
had any doubt about which islands were in question, as the content and context of the 
letters show . Also, wiiliin the same letter, the islands were referred to 
interchangeably as the 'Coco' and the 'Cocos ' islands, the latter being more 
common.29 Whether everyone looked up their precise position on a map is another 
matter. Whatever the case, it was eventually agreed that the procedure would be 
activated by a fonnal request from the Colonial Office to the Admiralty, asldng it to 
21Court of Directors to India Board, June 24, 1856, and following paper, CO 323 . 
248. PRO. 
28Colorual Office to India Board, July 17, 1856, and India Board to Colonial 
Office, September 24, 1856. CO 323 . 248 . PRO . 
29Halkesworth in the Colonial Office wrongly read some significance into tJUs in 
a minute of September 10, 1857. CO 323. 249. PRO. 
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instruct the officer commanding the East India Squadron to annex the Cocos Islands . 
The Colonial Office obliged. In a brief note which twice mentioned that officer by 
that description and referred to the islands as 'derelict' as the law officers had done, 
the Office borrowed their phrases and asked for a report 'of the Naval Officer's 
proceedings in the execution of this service, accompanied by as accurate an account 
as he may be able to furnish of the names of the several Cocos Islands, and of their 
geographical position' . 30 The Colonial Office sent the request on October 4, and the 
Admiralty received it that same day .31 October 4 1856 was a Saturday . Most 
government offices kept open until 2pm, though usually with a reduced staff. The 
Colonial Office copying clerks could then go home. The Admiralty, however, to take 
cognizance of messages coming in from its far-flung captains and commanders, 
maintained a skeleton staff throughout the weekend. Some messages came by 
telegraph , but most in packets or boxes of mail from its ships and establishments by 
whatever means , or combination of means, was quickest - packet-boat, rail, coach, 
horse, and cab. The urgency of a reply naturally varied . The Colonial Office letter 
of request was acted upon on the following Monday , October 6, a swift response after 
ten leisurely months . The Admiralty orders to its commander were copied and sent 
to all parties to the correspondence, except perhaps the law officers. Nobody saw 
anything amiss with them. P. Smith at the Colonial Office minuted 'Put by for the 
present?, . 32 
Nevertheless there were two unexpected features of the orders , not commented upon 
by readers who saw them as the outcome of months of correspondence. The first was 
3OColonial Office to Admiralty, October 4, 1856. The letter was drafted by P. 
Smith. CO 323 . 248 . PRO. 
31The Admiralty's retained copy of October 6, 1856, is in ADM 125/135 PRO 
together with the original letter from the Colonial Office of October 4, 1856. 
32Minute by P. Smith on Admiralty to Colonial Office, October 6, 1856. CO 323 . 
247 . PRO. 
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their unusual fonn and brevity. The second was that they were addressed not to the 
Commander of the East India squadron in Hong Kong, but to the Senior Officer of 
HM Ships and Vessels, Sydney, New South Wales .)) Why was this? Does it throw 
light on government processes or policies? 
To take the change of recipient flfSl: was it deliberate, or the outcome of some 
'presumption' as Tarling put it, or was it simple error? Admiralty clerks did make 
minor errors . Thus the Fremantles, a distinguished naval family, were sometimes 
mis-spelt Freemantle. The Admiralty's copy of the orders to the Senior Officer at 
Sydney, who was Captain S. G. Fremantle, said that they were the consequence of a 
Colonial Office letter of November 4 - wrong by a month. But it seems unlikely that 
error could account for such a switch of addressee. There is no explanation in the 
Admiralty records. Can circumstantial evidence provide a reason for the alteration, -
an alteration which had ·significant consequences? 
It can, if note is taken of the exact chronology of events . More than once in 1856 the 
Commander of the East India squadron had said that he was short of ships . He was 
Sir Michael Seymour, from another distinguished naval family . As yet tile Admiralty 
had not acted upon this , though Seymour was more likely to be taken notice of than 
his immediate predecessor, Sir James Stirling. Stirling had been recalled by the 
Admiralty in early 1856 because he had failed to pursue and destroy a Russian 
squadron, thought to have been lurking in the Pacific during the Crimean War.J4 Sir 
John Bowring, the British Superintendent of Trade in China, Governor of Hong Kong, 
linguist, hymn-writer, and ardent free-trader, had also asked for more naval ships to 
be sent - and for himself to be given some authority over them. He wanted to go with 
them to Japan, and make impressively-backed d'!mands for it to open its trade to 
)JAdmiralty to Senior Officer of H.M. Ships and Vessels, Sydney, October 6, 
1856. ADM 125. 135. PRO . 
J4W. G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, London, 1951, p.I44. 
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Britain.35 He had even wondered whether a joint French/British visit would be 
possible . However, he had been told by the Foreign Office to act on his previous 
instructions, which were to go with a British presence, and to do so only when he 
thought that British interests in China would not suffer from his absence. 36 Thus 
neither Admiralty nor Foreign Office had appeared to see a need for more ships in 
Hong Kong . 
Moreover, at first sight there seems little reason to think that any part of the British 
navy might lack ships in late 1856. Britain had the largest navy in the world, and was 
not at war. The Crimean War had ended with an informal Peace in March, and a 
proclaimed Peace on April 29. The first rumblings of the Sepoy Rebellion, otherwise 
known as the Indian Mutiny, were not heard until mid-May 1857, and while the 
'Arrow' incident, which led to Britain's second war against China, took place in 
October 1856, the AdmiriUty and the Foreign Office were ignorant of it for months . 
But the parliamentary oratory of Bright and Gladstone, criticising the waste of men 
and money in the Crimean War, had an effect on popular opinion and on Palrnerston' s 
cabinet. Immediately the Crimean War ended, there were large cuts in the armed 
forces . By October 1856 the numbers of men in the navy had been cut by a sixth, and 
ships from 328 to 270. 37 A further sixth of personnel were to be paid off over the 
next year. 38 There were also cutbacks in the dockyards . In May 1856 175 ships out 
of a total of less than 300 were being refitted or awaiting refitting.39 Two reasons 
35Bowring to Clarendon, F.O., in ADM 1 5678. PRO. 
36W. G. Beasley, Great Britain alld the Opening of Japan, London, 1851 , p.83 
and p.157. 
37ADM 8 135. PRO . 
38Naval and Military Gazette, December 6, 1857. 
39ADM 8 135 . PRO. 
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for the length of this queue were the repairs which had been postponed during the 
war, and the decision to fit more ships with steam. But there was a third reason . 
The Crimean War over, some 50,000 British troops plus the Italian contingent from 
Piedmont had to be brought home. The Admiralty did not welcome refitting ships for 
this purpose; it intended using only eight, withdrawing the men in relays . To 
accommodate this slow procedure, a treaty was signed with Turkey, permitting the 
troops to remain on Turkish soil for up to six months after the Peace, and a similar 
agreement made with Russia, the erstwhile foe :40 then, as the hot season advanced, 
General Sir William Codrington in the Crimea became increasingly critical of the 
Admiralty's arrangements .41 The main camp was 'clean and well cared-for - but ... 
has necessarily in its neighbourhood the buried remains of thousands' .42 Much faster 
evacuation was essential. Queen Victoria joined him in pressing this necessity on 
Lord Panmure at the War Office, and once he was converted, their combined 
persuasive powers influenced the Admiralty .43 An additional 13 vessels were refitted 
quickly as transports, and sent. The aim was to remove everyone by the end of July, 
Florence Nightingale insisting that 'everyone' included about fifty women who had 
followed the men to the Crimea, and had made themselves useful in the hospitals .44 
At least 13 large naval ships were despatched . 
4oConvention signed by Turkey, France and Britain, May 13, 1856, ADM 15678, 
and The Panmure Papers, ed. Douglas and 1. Ramsay, vol. 11,1908, p.169. 
41Panmure Papers, vol. 11, p.226. 
42Codrington to War Office, copy enclosed in War Dept. to Admiralty, June 20, 
1856. ADM 1 5677. 
43Queen Victoria to Panmure, May 26, 1856, Panmure Papers, vol. 11, pp .233-
234, 238. 'Not another moment to be lost in bringing home the troops' she wrote. 
44S. A. Tooley , The Life of Florence Nightingale, London, 1904, p.234. 
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Thanks largely to two of the most influential women of the nineteenth century, the 
objective was achieved. These ships then had to be altered again, and so added to the 
queue awaiting refilling in August and September.45 By the first of October, the 
refitting crisis was over, but while the navy might now have enough ships for 
peacetime requirements, they were not yet in the right places . The Admiralty did not 
seem to be moving with much haste . 
But on the same Saturday as it received tlle brief Colonial Office letter requesting 
annexation of the Cocos, the Admiralty also received more letters of different dates 
from Seymour of the East India Squadron. They were full of his re-positioning of 
such ships as he had - 15 altogether. Five had to remain in tlle five treaty ports of 
China, one was a hulk, used as a hospital ship in Trincomalee.46 With the remaining 
nine he had to patrol tlle coasts of India, fue Malay Peninsula, the coast of China, the 
China Seas, and the north-east Pacific. There was trouble on the Yangtze, where 
Chinese rebels were advancing steadily towards the coastal ports , and urged on by 
Bowring, Seymour wanted to visit Japan, to try to get better facilities for British ships 
than his predecessor Stirling had done. He was, he said, very short of ships .47 The 
Admiralty suddenly agreed with him, and responded with unaccustomed speed. On 
Monday October 6, immediate sea trials were ordered for two ships which had 
apparently been newly refitted. New captains were appointed to them, and they were 
to sail for Seymour's Hong Kong headquarters within a week.48 Why this change 
of pace? 
45ibid, p.194, and ADM 13 133 and ADM I 5677. PRO . 
46Digest and notes, Seymour to Admiralty, October 4. ADM 13. 133 . PRO. 
47ibid. 
48Monday, October 6,1856, Orders and Instructions , p.196. ADM 13 133. PRO. 
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Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, once the Crime an War had virtually ended, 
had a newfound object of belligerence: the United States. Since February 1856, he had 
egged on the Foreign Office to urge the Admiralty to send more ships to the East 
India squadron, envisaging war against the USA in the Pacific .49 The Admiralty had 
not done so, saying that such a move would have to wait on the course of the Crimean 
War. It may be that there had been some foot-dragging over this : not many Britons 
would have relished one war following so swiftly on another. Two further items 
fuelled Palmerston's belligerence. In May 1856 a British diplomat had been expelled 
from the United States for recruiting US citizens to fight in the Crimea during the 
war . His deeds had caused an uproar, especially among Irish Americans, and at last 
the US government had reacted . More expulsions and ill-feeling followed . Secondly, 
discord arose over possible violation by the USA of the Clayton Bulmer treaty (1850) 
governing US-British relations in Central America . Agreement on the latter issue was 
apparently reached in October, but Palmerston, not knowing of this, was still 
breathing fire and brimstone.5O (He later was confmned in his suspicion about US 
trustworthiness when the US Senate unilaterally changed the agreement) . The 
Admiralty did not know of tlle agreement either: it would be reasonable to suppose 
that Seymour' s letters were a reminder that action to satisfy Palmerston could no 
longer be postponed. By the end of 1856, Seymour had 26 ships assigned to him. 51 
The Foreign Office was told of the despatch of the first two, and it was agreed that 
it should be said that they were necessary to control piracy in the China Seas - indeed 
a continuing difficulty . 52 
4ge.g. Clarendon to Admiralty , ADM 1 5677, reply of February 23, 1856, and 
September 8, 1856. ADM 12620,52.26. PRO . 
SOAccount in Richard W. Van Alstyne, American Diplomacy ill Action, Stanford, 
California, revised edition 1947, and Van Alstyne, ed ., Anglo-American Relations, 
1853-57, Americall Historical Review, XLII, October and December 1950, pp.499-
550. 
51ADM 8 135. PRO. 
52See e.g. 21 in ADM 12 603. PRO . 
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It becomes understandable then that the Admiralty did not want to add to Seymour's 
tasks, or to divert the initial two ships sent to him, by asking him to annex the Cocos . 
The considerations of policy strategy, and logistics outlined above surely provide good 
reason for a deliberate change of addressee. It is reasonable to· suppose that 
Palmerston's wrath and Seymour' s needs were a major topic in tlle Admiralty over the 
weekend and on Monday October 6. Given these pre-occupations, it might well have 
seemed sensible to send the Cocos orders to Sydney, a sub-station of the East India 
Squadron. What nobody did was to check the geographical limits of the Sydney 
station' s conunission. They did not extend to the Bay of Bengal: they terminated at 
10° south of the equator. This might not have mattered, but it was given crucial 
importance by tlle fust feature of the order - its wlUsual form and brevity . Normally 
orders to annex included the latitude and longitude of the desired territory, or at least 
an unmistakeable description of its whereabouts ; tllis hastily written order had neither. 
Instead, a copy of the Colonial Office's short request to annex the Cocos, together 
with a brief covering note which merely re-iterated a few of its sentences, were all 
tl1at was sent. There was no explanation, and no detail of formalities , flag-hoisting , 
etc. . Attention in the Admiralty was elsewhere. 
Fremantle, Senior Officer of the Sydney station, had been told in his original sailing 
orders on leaving England in 1853 that he would receive orders both from the 
Conunander-in-Cllief of the East India Squadron, and from the Admiralty. When he 
received the latter, he was to act upon them without reference to the Squadron, though 
he was to report them to it. 53 Just as the preoccupations of the Admiralty with a 
possible war in the Pacific help to explain its neglect of the form , substance, and 
destination of the orders to annex the Cocos Islands, so tl1e combination of 
circumstances surrounding its recipient help to understand his reaction to them. 
530rders to Fremantle, February 14, 1854, ADM 2 1697. Fremantle's account, 
ADM 15631. PRO. 
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Fremantle's station was bounded by the meridian of 170° east of longitude on the 
west, and , as noted, by 10° latitude south. The Cocos Islands in the Bay of Bengal 
were not within these limits, but the Cocos (Keeling) Islands , at approximately 96° 
east and 12° south, indisputably were . In the total absence of any other information, 
it did not enter Fremantle's head tllat any but these islands were intended. 
Nevertheless, when he received the orders in January 1857, he was puzzled by them . 
In sending Seymour a copy, he wrote on January 20 ' I am at a loss to assign any 
particular reason why their Lordships have commanded this service to be carried out 
from Australia while could so much more readily and quicldy have been done from 
Singapore'. S4 His ship, the JUllO, was the only vessel at the Sydney station at that 
time. 'TIlat might however have escaped notice at the Admiralty '. Indeed it had . 
Fremantle knew of an ' English settlement formerly established on the Cocos 
Islands 'ss and presumed that the 'derelict' of the Admiralty 's letter meant that it had 
been abandoned. Given what he also knew of the occasionally ferocious winds of the 
latitude, that was not unlikely . He may even have known of the death of John Clunies 
Ross, often referred to as the proprietor of the islands , in 1854. From his recent 
experience in the southern Pacific Fremantle knew that French naval captains were on 
the lookout for suitable territories to annex, and that they had authority to do so 
without reference back to Paris . British naval captains could not act 
correspondingly .S6 He wrote that the very brevity of his orders might argue some 
haste, and so 'it might perhaps be prudent to use expedition in order to guard against 
S4Fremantle to Seymour, January 20, 1857, FRE 205, Greenwich Naval and 
Maritime Library . 
sSibid. 
S6'French and others are prowling about the world in search of New Possessions ' . 
Fremantle to Sir Thomas Fremantle, D/FR/213/1 2, Fremantle Papers, Aylesbury 
County Record Office . 
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the possibility of finding these outlying Islands already under the Flag of another 
nation' .57 
He did not comment on the complete absence of instruction, which might have caused 
him to pause, on the formalities observed but it would have been understandable if a 
rather flattering circumstance had suggested itself to him. On leaving Britain in 
1853 his sailing orders had been preceded by much Foreign Office and Admiralty 
consultation about the possible annexation of the Kuria Muria Islands, owned by the 
Imam of Muscat and Oman. 58 Fremantle was brought into the discussion, and his 
orders then required him, en route for Sydney, to complete delicate negotiations with 
the Imam to permit the islands' peaceful transfer to Britain. The government of India 
was not behind this acquisition. The Tory government hoped that the Kuria Murias 
might contain guano (superphosphate) for British agriculture, exposed to foreign 
competition since the abolition of tlle Corn Laws . This was to be concealed from the 
Imam. Fremantle had negotiated successfully, he had raised a new flagpole and fixed 
a copper plate to it as the Admiralty annexation orders carefully instructed,59 and he 
had arranged for the future preservation of British sovereignty by paying two young 
men nine dollars a year to run up the Union Jack on that flagpole whenever a ship 
hove in sight. In unusual warmth, the Admiralty wrote ' [you] executed the objects 
of your mission in a prudent and most satisfactory manner, and ... your conduct is in 
every way approved' . 60 He did not need further instructions about 'customary 
formalities ' .61 Thus the context of his past experience conditioned his response. 
57 Fremantle to Seymour, January 20, 1857, FRE 205, Greenwich Naval and 
Maritime Library. 
58Microfiche FO 54, piece 16 . PRO. 
59Fremantle's account is in ADM I 5631. PRO. 
60Admiralty to Fremantle, October 9, 1854, ADM 2. 
61Phrase used in Colonial Office to Admiralty, October 4, 1856, CO 323 . 248 . 
PRO . 
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Had the Cocos orders stated that the islands were those in the Bay of Bengal, would 
Fremantle have set forth without further inquiry? It is not impossible that he would 
have done so, both because he obeyed orders, and because he knew that the 
availability of a ship was more important to the Admiralty that the miles to be 
covered. Not only had his outward voyage to Australia taken him around the Cape, 
up the east coast of Africa to the Kuria Murias, then southwards via Sri Lanka and 
down the east coast of Australia; it had also encompassed a visit as the Admiralty's 
messenger to Rio de Janiero before catching the wind south-east to the Cape. 
Additionally, there were two further layers of explanation for Fremantle's setting sail 
promptly, as he confided in a letter to his brother,62 but did not tell the Admiralty, 
although it was aware of a general problem. 1llis was the difficulty of keeping order 
in a ship thousands of miles from home for years on end, and anchored from time to 
time in the harbours of Australia. Here the deferential mores of a traditional society 
were challenged by a new ethos, given courage by the hardship of much colonial life, 
the luck of the goldfields , and the availability of drink . Fremantle, prone to 
occasional gout, was supposed to avoid alcohol, but he was not averse to it, at least 
for others, as his wine merchant's bills showed .63 But he was opposed to its excess, 
and that excess was readily visible in Sydney. One man had been invalided off the 
Juno because of it, two had been in a state of 'near delirium tremens ' and others had 
suffered broken teetll, noses , and assorted fractures in drunken brawls ashore .64 'I 
am glad to have any excuse to absent myself from the contamination by too long an 
intercourse with the swaggering, secondchop Colonials of the Golden Region' he 
wrote in annoyance . An Admiralty circular directed him to curb excessive drinking 
62Fremantle to Sir Thomas Fremantle, May 27, 1857, D/FR/213/12, Aylesbury 
County Record Office . 
63They survive in the Fremantle papers in the Aylesbury County Record Office. 
64Fremantle to Sir Thomas Fremantle, May 27, 1857, D/FR/213/12, Aylesbury 
County Record Office . 
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by the crew. He had shown some tact, and encountered some hostility from his 
officers, when he stopped them from drinking on the quarterdeck in sight of the on-
duty crew .6S A brisk voyage would be a welcome alternative to the funo 's off-shore 
anchorage in Sydney Harbour, chosen to avoid 'contamination' (and abscondings to 
the goldfields) . 
Secondly, Fremantle had a disciplinary problem with his officers. Stirling, Seymour's 
predecessor, had sent a letter to await Fremantle's initial arrival in Sydney, telling him 
that there had been a 'refractory spirit' on the Australian station. Because there was 
not the necessary quorum of naval captains (six) to hold a court martial there, 'certain 
junior officers' were 'led to acts savouring strongly of mutiny and insubordination' . 
A court-martial could be held in Hong Kong or Britain, if necessary, however. 66 
Fremantle, forewarned , detected this spirit in his lieutenant, Hugo Bumaby, a brave 
man, but one who could be reduced by a reprimand to a state of 'extreme sensibility' 
for days.67 This officer was under ship arrest (though allowed ashore on certain 
conditions) while Fremantle reported his case to Stirling, as instructed, for advice on 
how to deal with him in the absence of a quorum.68 In the meantime Fremantle did 
as much of Burnaby's work as possible. A change of scene, with some legitimate 
celebration at its end, would reduce the likelihood of Burnaby's ' refractory spirit' 
spreading. Thus all circumstances conspired to cause Fremantle to sail for the Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands, which he did in early February 1857. Not for the first or last time, 
practical problems of command had an input on the course of events . 
6sPamphlet printed for Captain Fremantle, 1858, Greenwich Naval and Maritime 
Library, p.3\. 
66Extract from Stirling to Fremantle, November 25 , 1854, in D/FR12l61l0 , 
Aylesbury County Record Office. 
67Fremantle's account of Burnaby is in D/FR/2161211 -3 and the Juno's surgeon's 
at D/FR/2161l18, Aylesbury County Record Office . 
68ibid, and Fremantle's pamphlet, 1858, Greenwich Naval and Maritime Library . 
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On Fremantle's arrival at the islands, nothing led him to query his order to annex . 
John Clunies Ross, proprietor of the settlement, who had requested annexation of the 
islands more than once,69 had died over £2,000 in debt. His eldest son, John George 
Clunies Ross , who was endeavouring to payoff the debt, was absent. . However, the 
trim little settlement showed no 'dereliction'; its population of 222 Cocos Malays, 48 
Javanese, and 130 Batavians in their last year of penal servitude was supported by the 
production and trading of copra and coconut oil. There was no police force, and no 
corporal punishment. Fremantle was clearly impressed by this, and by the harbour 
inside the main lagoon of the atoll of islands, and the deeper anchorage outside it. 70 
Of French naval captains, it is true, he could report no sign, but he could say that a 
French vessel had put in five years previously, wanting not only to obtain supplies, 
but also 'to enter into a contract with Captain Ross for a general supply [of coconuts) 
or to rent some of the islands: but the terms could not be adjusted'. 71 The French 
had then appealed to the Dutch government who had refused to interfere, though they 
had granted Ross some trading rights in the East Indies. 72 The only naval vessel to 
visit the islands during Fremantle's sojourn was a Russian one, on its way back to tlle 
Baltic after spending the Crimean War hiding in the Amory River (Siberia). (Was this 
the 'Pacific Squadron' which Stirling had been blamed for not rmding?) 
Fremantle had written to the Governor-General of India of his imminent departure for 
the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, as he understood his orders to annex required, as well 
as to Hong Kong, before he left Sydney. But no small party from India arrived on 
69See M Ackrill, The Origins and Nature of the First Permanent Settlement on the 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Historical Studies, vo1.21, no .83, October 1984. 
7°Fremantle personally made numerous copies of his report. One is in CO 323 . 
249, another in ADM I 5684 . PRO. 
7libid. 
72Ross had certainly used a Dutch flag on his trading vessel, but to be allowed to 
do so had to employ a Javanese as captain. While it has been said that a Dutch flag 
flew on the Co cos (Keelings) for a time, there is no proof of this. 
21 
the islands to take over fonnal occupation, and so on May 7, 1857, he set sail and 
steam for Sydney. He left behind the returned John George Clunies Ross, in whom 
' it is not difficult to detect a little dejection on the sudden abrogation of his 
absolutism' , but also (important in the descendant of Jacobite Shetlanders) 'an 
intelligent and enterprising loyalty which neither time nor distance have impaired' .73 
When Fremantle returned to Sydney, he found there a letter from the Govemor-
General of India , which told him that the Cocos Islands in the Bay of Bengal had been 
the intended prey, 74 and which gave no sign whatever that his orders had been 
inadequate. If the wording Of his orders is borne in mind, there can be no doubt that 
Fremantle had behaved entirely reasonably . Yet being a good officer, he did not 
blame his superiors . Neither did he blame himself. 'The mistake which has occurred ' 
was his discreet phrase. 75 It surely was quite wrong to label it 'Captain Fremantle's 
mistake' as Tarling demonstrates that the offices in London were soon doing .76 John 
George Clunies Ross , whom Fremantle had dubbed 'Temporary Superintendent' was 
given this interpretation for his private infonnation when he visited London in 1860. 
His own title was neither confmned nor denied - and neither was the annexation 
disavowed.77 Reluctance to add to the empire except for the highly specific purpose 
of the Kuria Muria acquisition, or to comply with the wishes of the government of 
India, both at low cost, was not the same thing as disavowal . None of the London 
offices professed itself able to see how the mistake had happened. This might be 
because each viewed the matter so fmnly in the light of the previous correspondence 
73FremantJe's report, CO 323 . 249. PRO> Gibson Hill pointed out the 
importance of Ross ' s ancestry . 
74FremantJe to Admiralty, June 12, 1857, ADM 125 . 135. PRO. 
75Fremantle to Admiralty , June 12, 1856 (copy) CO 323. 249. PRO . 
76'Some misapprehension has arisen' was used in Admiralty to Merivale , 
September 7, 1857. CO 323 . 249. PRO. 
77Tarling, op. cit. . 
22 
that it ~as speaking the truth; it is also the case that none, so far as the record shows, 
ever checked Fremantle's territorial limits in his first orders. 
Does Tarling's term of 'presumption' (see p.5 above) in the Admiralty fit this 
episode? Surely 'preoccupation' is nearer the mark? 
And where does Tarling's ' little confusion of mind ' at the India Board enter the story? 
TIle answer must be that it does not. After hearing of the murder of shipwrecked 
sailors on the Andaman Islands, quite independently of Dalhousie, the Court of 
Directors in 1855 wanted a settlement on these islands, to 'conciliate' their small 
(typical height four feet nine inches) but reputedly fierce inhabitants . And, as it later 
said, it would be 'highly inconvenient and objectionable ' if 'strangers' occupied the 
islands, the more so since Dalhousie's Burmese conquests .78 By the time their 
despatch about the Andamans was answered from India, Dalhousie had been replaced 
by Canning, who demurred . 79 The Court persisted, and on October I, 1856, after 
the procedure for the Cocos had been agreed, it wrote to Canning, asking that he send 
a steamer to tile Andamans to explore them, and choose a site for a convict colony, 
which, it had been decided, would be the least expensive way of beginning a 
settlement. so It said that although British sovereignty over the Andamans was 'in 
abeyance', there was 'no impediment to our re-assertion of them' .81 It knew this of 
course from the letter of the law officers of April 29 1856 (see above) . It also asked 
for a report on the Andamans, and for a report, though no exploration, of the nearby 
78p. N. Tarling, Pirates and Convicts , Journal of Indian History, XXVI, pt.3, 
1960, reprinted in Imperial Britain in South East Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p.248. 
79Evident from Court of Directors to Governor-General, October I, 1856, Board's 
Collection, 192739, C & DO. 
SOCaptain H. Hopkinson to W. Grey , February 8, 1856, Selections from the 
Records of the Government of India (Home Department), no. XXV, Calcutta , 1859. 
81Court of Directors to Governor-General, October I , 1856, Board 's Collection, 
192 739, C & DO, and Selections etc. p.49. 
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Nicobar Islands. Their sovereignty had been abandoned by the Danish govenunent 
in 1847 because, like the Andamans, they were very unhealthy.82 Its request, which 
amounted to a command, made no mention of the islands of Great and Little Coco. 
To the best of the Court's knowledge at that date these were already· taken care of 
through the orders which the Admiralty was about to issue on receiving instructions 
from the Colonial Office .g) 
Canning, in a reply dated April 8, 1857, pointed out that the Andaman exploration 
would have to be carried out in the less stormy weather of the autwnn. In the 
meantime, he caused a report to be made from all the sources available in Calcutta . 
Dated May 2, 1857, Gust a few days before the Indian Mutiny began) its heading said 
that it was a report on the Andaman, Coco, and Nicobar Islands, and indeed it carried 
a brief description of the Great and Little Cocos.M When the exploration of the 
Andamans duly took place at the end of the year, the inspecting committee did not 
inspect the Cocos Islands, remarking that they were 'too directly in the tracks of 
commerce, and are deficient in harbours'.ss 
Why were the Cocos included in these two reports when the Court had not mentioned 
them? Tarling infers that it was because 'the Andamans as a whole' were under 
consideration by tile India Board. The correspondence does not bear this out. The 
answer most probably lies once more in a careful consideration of dates. May 2, 
1857, the date of the first report, was also the date on which Canning wrote to the 
82Selections etc. p.51 . 
g)Indeed, it had mistakenly been told on October 3, 1856, that the Colonial Office 
had already sent its request to the Admiralty . Board 's Collections, 192. 739, C & 
DO . 
MGovemor-General to Court of Directors, enclosing a precis of what was known 
of Andaman, Coco, and Nicobar Islands , May 22, 1857, Selections etc . p.53 . 
g~ibid, Selections etc . p.74. 
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Court that he had received Fremantle's letter of January 20, saying he was setting 
forth soon for the Cocos (Keeling) Islands . Canning had known this since April 21 , -
time enough to see that other steps were therefore necessary to secure Great and 
Little Coco, and tin1e enough to slip them into the report. As his letter of May 2 went 
on to say, when possession was taken of the Andamans, the smaller islands could be 
occupied. 
Tarling attributes 'confusion of mind' to the India Board because on tlle back of the 
India Office copy of the Court's letter to Canning of October I, 1856, are two undated 
pencilled notes. 86 The frrst , by John SlUart Mill , the Board's longtime employee, 
and its Examiner of Correspondence since March 1856, says 'there is nothing in this 
draft (i.e. copy) about the Cocos islands' . The second, which is anonymous, replies 
'They are far to tlle southward'. If made on receipt of ilie Court' s 'draft', Mills' note 
might indicate a hazy recollection of Burkinyoung's request and ilie subsequent 
correspondence, such vagueness being understandable in a minor matter . His duty 
was to supervise, not originate, all correspondence on major matters, and additionally, 
in his frrst year in his new office, he had no assistant, and was doing his work as 
well. 87 The second note, perhaps written by a newcomer, shows entire unawareness 
boili of Burkinyoung, and of ilie existence of Great and Little Coco, so close to 
Burma. 
However, it is also possible iliat ilie notes were written later tllan October 1856, 
perhaps upon Mills ' receipt of Canning's letter of May 2, 1857 (which told iliat 
Fremantle was about to armex ilie wrong islands) and of ilie report of May 2 OD ilie 
Andaman, Cocos and Nicobar Islands . They might ilien represent Mills' puzzlement 
as to why ilie Cocos were included in ilie report, or his half-hearted attempt to 
discover why ilie Co cos (Keeling) Islands had been armexed. In eiilier case, tlle 
86See Tarling, Historical Studies, 1957/8. 
87M. SU. Packe, The Life of John Stuan Mill, London, 1954, p.387. 
25 
responding note is not really explanatory; it might have intended to placate . 
Ignorance, rather than confusion, is revealed . 
One puzzle remains . Fremantle, as ordered, returned the Juno to Britain in late 1857. 
His annexation had been given no publicity: why did he not, in confidence, justify his 
actions to the Admiralty, or the India Board, or the Court of Directors? 
Once more, the evidence is circumstantial, but compelling, and sheds light on the 
practical difficulties of command. Fremantle had other pre-occupations. Burnaby had 
been under ship arrest intermittently since mid-1856. The voyage to the islands had 
compounded, not eased, Fremantle's disciplinary problems with his officers . The 
night before leaving Sydney, the Juno lay just inside Sydney Heads , sails at the ready, 
not fully furled, waiting for the morning breeze. This was good preparation, but 
vigilance was needed in case a night wind arose and caused the ship to drag anchor.88 
Fremantle, who had previous brushes with the officers concerned, was angry to fmd 
one asleep on the watch, and another absent from his post - both in themselves serious 
offences on any ship . They tried to explain and argue with him, which compounded 
the offences.89 They too were put under ship arrest on the voyage to the islands and 
back, and on the return voyage to England. While for the latter voyage Fremantle 
engaged an additional officer, on the former there was no time to do so, and in both 
instances he did as much of their work as possible. They were allowed shore leave 
in the islands, and Burnaby , under pressure from the Juno 's surgeon, had been 
allowed ashore frequently on Sydney' s Garden Island (with paints and easel , and an 
88Fremantle, Pamphlet, 1858, Greenwich Naval and Maritime Museum. 
89"fhe offences are specified in quarterly return, quarter ending December 31 , 
1857. ADM 153 1 PRO . The Admiralty had previously reproved Fremantle for 
accepting a remonstrance from another officer, then had overturned this judgement. 
ADM 619 PRO, and United Services Gazette, April 4, 1857. 
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orderly to see that he did not attempt to escape)90 but the delights and temptations of 
Sydney were denied all three. They were pennitted to go wherever and speak to 
whomever they pleased on board . This was not 'incarceration' but it was no doubt 
much resented by the officers, and reported with hostile embellishments in the Sydney 
press, ever alert for scandal.91 
On his return from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Fremantle had found a letter from 
Seymour, in reply to the one which he had written to Stirling in the previous year 
outlining Bumaby's offences and asking how to proceed. Seymour, while reminding 
Fremantle that regulations permitted him to return the officers to their duties pending 
a court-martial, had written 'I have to desire you will bring specific charges against 
Lieutenant Bumaby that he may be brought to Court Martial on the funo's return to 
England,. 92 Fremantle preferred charges against all three. On his arrival off 
Spithead, he asked the ."Admiralty for instructions .93 He received aexceedingly 
obscure telegram, which, like the one which followed, was intended to cause him to 
drop the charges . Convinced, however, that Seymour had wanted him to go ahead, 
he did not take the hint. 
Then disaster followed disaster for Fremantle. News came that his mother, whom he 
had looked forward to seeing, had died somewhat unexpectedly . His crew, kept 
90D FR 216/1/1 -9, Aylesbury County Record Office. 
9lBell's Life and Sporting Review, Sydney, July 4, 1857, referring to an 
anonymous letter in the Empire, Sydney of June 30. The author most probably was 
a certain (temporary) ex- officer of a different ship, who had been dismissed for 
breaking his undertaking with the navy not to publish articles without prior approval . 
He had also altered the destination of his pay cheques, which he had promised to send 
to his wife . 
92Seymour to Fremantle, December 16, 1856, (received June 12, 1857) D FR 
216/117, Aylesbury County Record Office. 
9JNaval alld Military Gazette, November 21, 1857. 
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aboard (while he awaited clarification) in a chill November after nearly four years in 
the sub-tropics , fell i11. 94 He had intended to base his court-martial against the three 
officers on Stirling's letter about 'refractory spirits' and the need to proceed to court-
martial . But he was told that he could not introduce this letter, or the -general advice 
and specific instructions which the Admiralty had issued about discipline, into his 
statements. The grounds for this ruling were that they formed part of the 'Captain 's 
Book' - despite Fremantle's having kept the book in the officers' mess so that they 
would see the instructions .95 Exhausted and bewildered, and uttering some rather 
odd phrases , Fremantle was quite unable to continue after the first day, and sat with 
his head in his hands, speaking of'a confusion in my head'. The officers spoke well 
for themselves , and also engaged lawyers . Only an index heading relating to the court 
martial survives in the Admiralty records, but it can be reconstructed from assorted 
journal and newspaper reports - none of which, however, mentioned the refusal to 
allow Fremantle to use Uie instructions which had guided him.96 
All but one of the charges were dismissed, and that charge was punished by a 
reprimand. Fremantle himself was reprimanded for bringing serious charges on 
insufficient evidence and was compulsorily retired - though first he had to see to the 
removal from the funD to hospital of nearly a hundred invalids, payoff the crew, 
settle the ship's accounts (including one for china breakages in his own cabin in four 
years at sea) and distribute some medals. 97 Fremantle may well have been right in 
thinking that sensational reports of life on the funo had circulated in Britain before the 
94ibid. 
95Fremantle, Pamphlet, 1858, Greenwich Naval and Maritime Museum, and D FR 
217/4/1, Aylesbury County Record Office. 
961fle most extensive press reports of the trial are in tlle Naval and Military 
Gazette of 1857, Daily News, December 3, 1857, and the Times of 21, 25 , 28 
November, 1857. 
97Admiralty Board minute of November 29, 1857, ADM 12635. PRO . Orders 
etc., Paying off 1857, D FR/2l3/8-9, and D FR 215/5-8. 
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cases were heard. The British press reported the court-martial at length, and its 
comments were hostile to Fremantle. Though it was true that he had spent much of 
his life ashore, this was an ignominious end to a promising career. The Admiralty'S 
praise of the Kuria Muria exploits had been succeeded by its praise for his careful 
reports on his Pacific voyages, describing proud Fiji chiefs and forlorn uprooted 
Pitcaim Islanders with considerable understanding .98 Through the intervention of his 
brother, Sir Thomas Fremantle, MP, he was given some defence in parliament,99 and 
eventually, at his brother's urging, wrote a pamphlet justifying the court-martial and 
his actions, and explaining his views of naval service. 100 It was published in 1858, 
and shows him to have been pedantic on some points, but by no means uniformly 
unreasonable - or unpopular - on the Juno. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands were a 
secondary issue for him, compared with the court-martial, and were not mentioned. 
He became ill Witll tuberculosis and epilepsy, the former quite probably the cause of 
the latter. It is possible that the frrst sign of the epilepsy was the 'confusion' which 
he felt at the court martial!OI He died in mid-1860, aged 49, and with him died the 
strongest incentive to refute the reasoning - or lack of it - which had labelled his 
annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands as 'Captain Fremantle's mistake' . 
* * * * * 
The circumstances surrounding the annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in 1857 
point to several conclusions. The frrst is that there was no general impulse towards 
annexation of territories by the cabinet, the Colonial Office, the Admiralty, or even 
the Court of Directors or the India Board. Not was there any general government 
98ADM 125 135 and ADM 1.5672. PRO . 
99Speech by Sir Charles Wood, December 7, 1857, Hansard 3rd series, vol. 
cols. 269-271. 
100Sir T. Fremantle to [S o G.) Fremantle, December 3, and 4, 1857, D FR 
2181711-13, Aylesbury County Record Office . 
IOIMedical report on [So G.) Fremantle, by Sir Henry Acland, for Sir T. 
Fremantle, FRE 21911-24, Aylesbury County Record Office . 
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endeavour to extend informal empire. Instead, conditioned partly by the cost of the 
Crimean War, there was a determined attempt to minimise expenditure, and this 
worked against government involvement in expansion. The government of India met 
its own internal expenses, and so there was some predisposition to listen to its 
requests , but the Court of Directors was uneasy about the mounting costs of the 
combination of reform and assimilation of territory in India . Yet in government 
circles, prestige was undeniablyu attached to British dominion in India . To separate 
the weighting given to prestige in the minds of office-holders and decision-makers 
from that given by them to interest in the sense of general economic benefit conferred 
on the nation through possession in India or from weighting given to the fmancial 
interests of those with investments in the East India Company, is impossible . There 
were certainly no overt cost-benefit analyses in this instance. Affmity of outlook and 
social class among government offices is evident, but no sign of tenderness to 
investors and fmanciers,on the Cain and Hopkins model, appear. 
Next, the eventual resumption of sovereignty over the Andamans and Great and Little 
Coco (and their later history has its ironies) may have marginally increased the 
security of possessions in India and the safety of sea travel , and therefore at several 
removes benefited East India Company stockholders . But it was quite clear that such 
benefit was , contrary to the Huttenback and Davis doctrine, not to be at the expense 
of British taxpayers . 
Nor was the annexation of the Kuria Murias, Captain Fremantle's introduction to tlag-
hoisting, any significant charge on the public purse. It was indeed a consequence of 
the empire of free trade - but not as that phrase is used by Gallagher and Robinson. 
The genesis of their annexation was in measures to improve the productivity of British 
agriculture after the repeal of tlle Corn Laws in 1846 exposed it to competition. To 
this end, quite exceptional domestic laws had been passed by parliament, beginning 
with the Agricultural Drainage Act of the same year, which gave outright grants to 
farmers and all social ranks. The Kuria Muria annexation was an exception in the 
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imperial saga brought about by political considerations and social affmity with the 
landed interest. The islands proved useless as a source of fertiliser, as Captain 
Fremantle foresaw, and their annexation was a virtually costless anomaly . 
The annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands was different again . Here there were 
no traditions of overseas power or prestige or profit, nor the impetus of domestic 
British need . There had been persistent refusal to annex the islands, and after 
annexation, decades of non-expenditure on them followed . All that happened was 
their nominal incorporation into the government of Ceylon in 1878, and their transfer 
to the Straits Settlement and then the government of Singapore in 1884 and 1903 
respectively . The second of these arrangements entailed a roughly biermial visit to the 
islands , but virtually no other cost, since the Clunies Ross family were left in charge 
of the iswlands' cOllununity until 1944. 
Therefore none of these annexations falls into the theories of turbulent frontiers, or 
of systematic and centrally determined policies advanced by Davis and Huttenback or 
Cain and Hopkins . This is not sufficient grounds for dismissing the theories, but it 
should make us look rather more carefully at pragmatic rather than systematic causes 
for the extension of empire . 
Yet there is a conunon thread linking the three annexations, and most evident in the 
case of the Cocos (Keeling) annexation. This is the asswnption at the heart of empire 
and also at the periphery that the British navy was ubiquitous, and capable of any task, 
large or small, anywhere . The assumption was fmnly entrenched in the mind of 
Palmerston , who , more than anyone else in government, was prepared to use the navy 
belligerently. 
A major and perhaps fortunate impediment to his impulses was the slow speed of 
communication in the middle of the nineteenth century . Telegraphs and cables were 
far from ubiquitous overseas , and in London copy clerks and messengers laboured to 
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keep government offices informed of what each was doing. The wonder is that 
difficulties of the type exemplified in the Cocos (Keeling) episode did not occur more 
frequent! y . 
If a theory has to be found to fit this episode, the preoccupations of that weekend in 
the Admiralty , when Palmerston appeared to be striding towards a war with the United 
States, should be remembered. Then perhaps it might seem that at least one case has 
been found to confmn an older hypothesis : Seeley's proposition that the empire had 
been acquired in a fit of absence of mind . 102 
I02Sir Jolm Seeley, The Expansion of England (1883) lecture 1. 
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